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Having promoted glo-
bal radicalism and regional rejectionism, engaged in terrorism, and pursued
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for years, Libya has shifted away from
its “rogue state” policies, most especially by settling the Pan Am 103 Lockerbie
terrorism case and by abandoning its programs for the development of nu-
clear, chemical, and biological weapons.1 The key policy changes started in
1999, when Libya surrendered two Lockerbie suspects for trial in The Hague,
and culminated in 2003 with the settlement of the Lockerbie case that August
and particularly Libya’s December 19 announcement that it had agreed to
abandon its WMD programs and allow international inspections.
The debate over who deserves credit for these important changes in Libyan
policy is a lively one politically and a challenging one analytically.2 Among the
questions that analysts have sought to answer are: To what extent was Libyan
leader Muammar Qaddaª intimidated by the George W. Bush administration’s
decision to invade Iraq and the broader Bush doctrine of preemptive force?
How important was diplomacy, especially the secret talks between Libya and
the United States that started late in Bill Clinton’s administration and contin-
ued into the Bush administration, with the British playing a signiªcant role?
What other factors, including Libya’s internal politics and economy, came into
play? And what are the lessons for dealing with other terrorism-supporting,
WMD-seeking, and otherwise aggressive states?
Positions in this debate have been sharply staked out. “I hope to never have
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1. On December 21, 1988, Pan Am ºight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 passen-
gers and crew, including 189 Americans, as well as 11 people on the ground. The United States and
Britain held Libya responsible for the bombing.
2. Although Libya’s leader, Muammar Qaddaª, continues to engage in periodic outlandish rheto-
ric and provocative actions—for example, his apparent role in the attempted assassination of
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in 2003 and persistent human rights violations at home—the combi-
nation of the Lockerbie settlement largely on Western terms and full WMD abandonment do
amount to signiªcant policy changes. We thus enclose “won” in quotes both to account for the suc-
cess achieved and to acknowledge that the full extent and deªnitiveness of Libya’s policy changes
are not yet clear.
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to use force,” President Bush stated, “but speaking clearly and sending mes-
sages that we mean what we say, we’ve affected the world in a positive way.
Look at Libya. Libya was a threat. Libya is now peacefully dismantling its
weapons programs. Libya understood that America and others will enforce
[the Bush] doctrine.” Vice President Dick Cheney cast Libya’s concessions
on WMD as “one of the great by-products . . . of what we did in Iraq and
Afghanistan,” stressing that just “ªve days after we captured Saddam
Hussein, Mu’ammar Qaddaª came forward and announced that he was going
to surrender all of his nuclear materials to the United States.”3 Others found
this timing less signiªcant and gave more credit to diplomacy. These included
key Clinton ofªcials such as Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk, who led
the 1999–2000 secret talks and contended that “Libyan disarmament did not
require a war with Iraq”; Bush administration ofªcials such as Deputy Secre-
tary of State Richard Armitage, for whom Hussein’s capture “didn’t have any-
thing to do” with Libya’s concessions; and British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
who stressed that “problems of proliferation can, with good will, be tackled
through discussion and engagement” and that “countries can abandon pro-
grams voluntarily and peacefully.”4 Libyan Prime Minister Shukri Ghanem as-
serted that his government based its decision on an independent assessment of
its national interests, on “a careful study of the country’s future in all its do-
mains . . . conforming to the aspirations of the Libyan leadership and people.”
Qaddaª’s son Seif el-Islam el-Qaddaª said that the December 19 agreement
was a “win-win deal” for both sides: “[Our] leader believed that if this prob-
lem were solved, Libya would emerge from the international isolation and
become a negotiator and work with the big powers to change the Arab
situation.”5
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3. Bush made his remarks in the ªrst presidential debate with John Kerry in the fall of 2004;
Cheney made his comments in the vice presidential debate with John Edwards. David Ignatius, “A
Gaddaª Cover-up,” Washington Post, October 26, 2004. See also Andrew Gumbel, “Libya Weapons
Deal: U.S. Neo-conservatives Jubilant over WMD Agreement,” Independent (London), December
22, 2003; and Tod Lindberg, “A Policy of Prevention: The Administration’s Strategy against WMD
Is Working,” Washington Times, December 30, 2003.
4. Martin S. Indyk, “The Iraq War Did Not Force Gaddaª’s Hand,” Financial Times (London),
March 9, 2004; Martin S. Indyk, “Was Kadaª Scared Straight? The Record Says No,” Los Angeles
Times, March 28, 2004; Richard Armitage, “State’s Armitage Attributes Positive Developments to
Steadfast Policies,” interview by Juan Williams, National Public Radio, December 23, 2003, http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId?1568912; Flynt Leverett, “Why Libya Gave Up
on the Bomb,” New York Times, January 23, 2004; and Tony Blair, statement on Libya, December 19,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3336073.stm. See also Joseph Cirincione, “The
World Just Got Safer: Give Diplomacy the Credit,” Washington Post, January 11, 2004.
5. “Libyan Prime Minister Says Weapons Decision Motivated by Economy, Oil,” Al-Hayat, Decem-
This debate is enormously signiªcant in its own right. For close to thirty
years, Libya has been a major concern for the United States, Europe, Africa, the
Middle East, and the international community more generally. The Libya case
also has signiªcance in two broader respects. First, it bears upon other key
policy debates about WMD proliferation and rogue states, particularly as man-
ifested in such pressing cases as Iran and North Korea as well as in the context
of continuing debates about U.S. intervention in Iraq.6 Second, the Libya case
is relevant to debates over theories of force and diplomacy, particularly work
on coercive diplomacy.7 Coercive diplomacy can be a “beguiling” strategy, as
Alexander George and William Simons warn, seeming easier to do than analy-
sis shows it to be and than it has proven to be.8 As the strongest case of coer-
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cive diplomacy success since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Libya case
provides useful insights for more general propositions about the scope and
limits of this balancing of force and diplomacy that “can help bridge the gap
between theory and practice.”9
In this article, we analyze three phases of U.S. coercive diplomacy toward
Libya: ªrst, the Ronald Reagan presidency, characterized principally by U.S.
sanctions and military force (1981–88); second, shifts toward a more multilat-
eral and sanctions-based strategy in the George H.W. Bush and Clinton admin-
istrations (1989–98); and third, the secret direct negotiations initiated in the
latter years of the Clinton administration and continued in the George W. Bush
administration, culminating in the December 19 agreement on WMD (1999–
2003). We show how coercive diplomacy failed in the ªrst phase, had mixed
results in the second, and succeeded in the third. These differences are princi-
pally explained by (1) the extent of “balance” in the coercer state’s strategy
combining credible force and deft diplomacy consistent with three criteria—
proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility—taking into account inter-
national and domestic constraints; and (2) the vulnerability of the target state
as shaped by its domestic politics and economy, particularly whether elites
and other key political actors play a “circuit breaker” or “transmission belt”
role, blocking or carrying forward the external coercive pressure against the
regime.
The next section develops this analytic framework in the context of the coer-
cive diplomacy and related force-diplomacy literatures. We then present the
Libya case study through its three coercive diplomacy phases. The ªnal section
develops the analytic conclusions for the Libya case and draws out implica-
tions for both theory and policy.
Analytic Framework: Coercive Diplomacy Success and Failure
Drawing on the literature, we posit two sets of variables, one focusing on
coercer state strategy and the other on the target state’s domestic politics and
economy. Both are key to coercive diplomacy success or failure.10
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Peace, 1993); and Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Need for Praxis: Bringing Policy Relevance Back In,”
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 169–183.
10. George and Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 270–274, 279–291, identify ªve contex-
tual variables, nine conditions, and four variants. Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Di-
coercer strategy
In broad terms, a coercer state strategy is most likely to succeed if the costs of
noncompliance it can impose on, and the beneªts of compliance it can offer to,
the target state are greater than the beneªts of noncompliance and costs of
compliance. Whether a particular coercive diplomacy strategy strikes this bal-
ance depends on its meeting three key criteria: proportionality, reciprocity, and
coercive credibility.
“Proportionality” refers to the relationship within the coercer’s strategy be-
tween the scope and nature of the objectives being pursued and the instru-
ments being used in their pursuit. The more the coercer demands of the target,
the higher the target’s costs of compliance and the greater the need for the
coercer’s strategy to increase the costs of noncompliance and the beneªts of
compliance. Yet coercive diplomacy is, by deªnition, a strategy of limited
means. As George explains, coercive diplomacy may, but is not required to, go
beyond threats to the actual use of military force; but if force is actually used, it
must be limited and fall short of full-scale use or war.11 Otherwise, as Robert
Art points out, coercive diplomacy has failed, even if the coercer has achieved
its objectives: “In this case, war, not coercive diplomacy, produced the
change.”12 Coercive diplomacy thus is well short of what Thomas Schelling
calls the “take what you want” strategy of brute force.13 These inherently lim-
ited means require that the objectives also be limited so that there is propor-
tionality between ends and means. The main source of disproportionality is an
objective that goes beyond policy change to regime change. It is hard enough
to coerce alterations in the target’s policy, either as what George and Simons
call “type A” coercive diplomacy of convincing an opponent “to stop short of
the goal,” or “type B” coercive diplomacy of getting an opponent “to undo the
action.” It is even more difªcult with “type C” objectives, aimed at “cessation
of the opponent’s hostile behavior through a demand for change in the compo-
sition of the adversary’s government or in the nature of the regime”—that is,
regime change as distinct from policy change.14 Although we do not go so far
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adding three factors of their own, and providing additional reasons why coercive diplomacy is in-
herently difªcult.
11. Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy: Deªnition and Characteristics,” in George and
Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, p. 10.
12. Robert J. Art, “Introduction,” in Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, p. 10.
13. Schelling, Arms and Inºuence, p. 2.
14. George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” p. 8; and Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Reagan Administration ver-
sus Nicaragua: The Limits of ‘Type C’ Coercive Diplomacy,” in George and Simons, The Limits of
as to posit a strict linear relationship between more limited objectives and
more likely success, we do consider the line between policy change and regime
change to be a crucial proportionality threshold.15
“Reciprocity” involves an explicit, or at least mutually tacit, understanding
of linkage between the coercer’s carrots and the target’s concessions.16 This
linkage may be explicitly incremental, as in George’s conception of conditional
reciprocity and Robert Axelrod’s tit-for-tat strategy.17 It does not have to be,
though, so long as the target does not think it can achieve the beneªts without
having to reciprocate. On the other hand, if the target is unsure if the coercer
state will reciprocate, it may question whether the costs of its concessions are
worth the return. The balance lies in neither offering too little too late or for too
much in return, nor offering too much too soon or for too little in return.
“Coercive credibility” requires that, in addition to calculations about costs
and beneªts of cooperation, the coercer state convincingly conveys to the tar-
get state that noncooperation has consequences. The combination of the intim-
idation that results from coercive credibility and the reassurance cultivated
through reciprocity creates a complementarity that can make for a force-
diplomacy balance lacking in either alone. Threats, actual uses of force, and
other coercive instruments (e.g., economic sanctions) must be sufªciently cred-
ible to raise the target’s perceived costs of noncompliance. A superior military
force or economic position, however, is not enough. The United States is the
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1991–94 Haiti case study, which mistakenly attributes the success to coercive diplomacy when in-
stead it required deployment of a full-scale U.S. military intervention force.
15. The economic sanctions literature shows a similar pattern, with domestic political change be-
ing a more difªcult objective than foreign policy change. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J.
Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990); David A. Baldwin, Economic State-
craft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions:
Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003); Bruce W. Jentleson,
“Economic Sanctions and Post–Cold War Conºicts: Challenges for Theory and Policy,” in Paul C.
Stern and Daniel Druckman, eds., International Conºict Resolution after the Cold War (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000); and Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not
Work,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90–136.
16. Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 388–389, give particular emphasis
to the utility of positive inducements. See also Euclid A. Rose, “From a Punitive to a Bargaining
Model of Sanctions: Lessons from Iraq,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3 (September
2005), pp. 459–479, who proposes a “bargaining model” of compliance in which reciprocity plays a
central role.
17. George, Bridging the Gap, pp. 50–57; and Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New
York: Basic Books, 1984).
coercing state in all of the cases examined by Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, as
well as those in George and Simons’s case studies (in some cases unilaterally,
in others as a coalition leader, but always in a principal role), all against targets
less militarily powerful; yet U.S. coercive diplomacy in these cases failed more
often than it succeeded.18
All three elements of a balanced coercive diplomacy strategy are more likely
to be achieved if other major international actors are supportive and if opposi-
tion within the coercing state’s domestic politics is limited. Thus, not only
substantive strategy but also the domestic and international contexts are im-
portant. In the case that we examine here, the key international actors were
Western Europe, both for its diplomatic weight and economic capacity as a po-
tential alternative trade partner for Libya; the United Nations; and regional ac-
tors such as Saudi Arabia and South Africa. On the domestic side, a new type
of actor—terrorism victims’ families, in this case families of the Pan Am 103
Lockerbie bombing victims—acted as the major domestic constraint on U.S.
policy. Victims’ families, be they the Lockerbie families or the families of vic-
tims of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, do not fall neatly into the
usual typology of economic, ethnic, and ideological pressure groups. Yet given
the post–September 11 threats to personal and national security, their inºuence
is likely to continue as part of U.S. foreign policy politics.
target politics and economy
The second set of variables involves domestic political and economic condi-
tions within the target state affecting its vulnerability to coercive diplomacy.
Relational factors, such as asymmetry of motivation stressed in other coercive
diplomacy studies, offer some sense of the target as not just an object to be
acted upon, and of coercive diplomacy success or failure as not just a function
of the relative distribution of power. But they still leave questions about the
sources of motivational asymmetry and the target’s ability to compensate for
unfavorable power balances. This requires more direct analytic emphasis on
political and economic forces within the target state and how they inºuence its
assessment of the costs and beneªts of compliance versus noncompliance.
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18. In the words of Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, p. 402, “The posses-
sion of military superiority over the target does not guarantee success of coercive diplomacy.” See
also Elaine M. Hoboloff, “Bad Boy or Good Business? Russia’s Use of Oil as a Mechanism of Coer-
cive Diplomacy,” in Freedman, Strategic Coercion, pp. 179–211.
Although regime type is a factor, it does not determine either how or
how much a target state can counter coercive diplomacy. The Art-Cronin and
George-Simons case studies almost all involve nondemocratic target states, yet
they show successes as well as failures, including a mixed record within the six
1990s cases involving the same nondemocratic regime: Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq.19
Our analysis of target domestic politics and economics starts with the ge-
neric proposition of regime self-perpetuation. Leaders want to stay in power,
whether for the allotted terms as in democracies or on the more open-ended
basis possible in nondemocracies. Qaddaª’s preferred strategy for remaining
in power has been repressive rule at home and confrontational rhetoric, if not
action, abroad. Whether his self-perpetuation could be sustained in the face of
coercive diplomacy has depended on three interrelated domestic factors. The
ªrst factor is whether internal political support and regime security are served
by deªance or if there are domestic political gains to be made from improving
relations with the coercing state. Even when costs are to be borne, an external
threat often can enhance the domestic legitimacy of the target regime, provid-
ing a rationale for domestic repression or resulting in what Johan Galtung re-
fers to as a “politically integrative effect.”20 Alternatively, invocation of this
threat may have faded in potency; perhaps some shared interests may even
have emerged, as for example against common superseding enemies. More
generally, domestic political costs produced by coercive instruments may have
less inºuence on the target’s leadership if political support for the regime is
strong, whereas the same instruments and political costs are likely to have
more inºuence when there is less regime support.
The second factor is an economic calculation of the costs that military force,
sanctions, and other coercive instruments can impose and the beneªts that
trade and other economic incentives may carry. This in part is a function of the
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19. Art and Cronin, The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, assess six distinct cases of U.S. coer-
cive diplomacy against Iraq in the 1990s: three as failures (1990–91, to coerce withdrawal from Ku-
wait in the 1991 Persian Gulf War; 1996, to end attacks against Kurds in northern Iraq; and 1998, to
strengthen the UN WMD inspections); two as mixed (1991, to establish safe havens for the Kurds
and Shiites, and 1992–93, to establish no-ºy zones to facilitate access for UN WMD inspectors);
and one as a success (1994 to deter the apparent planned reinvasion of Kuwait).
20. This dynamic was stressed by Johan Galtung in his classic formulation assailing “naïve theo-
ries of economic warfare” that “do not take into account the possibility that value deprivation may
initially lead to political integration and only later—perhaps much later, or even never—to politi-
cal disintegration.” Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples
from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3 (April 1967), p. 407.
strength and ºexibility of the target state’s domestic economy and its capacity
to absorb or counter the costs being imposed through ample budget resources,
import substitution, alternative trade partners, and other ways of reducing
economic vulnerability. However, even if such costs are neutralized, there may
still be signiªcant opportunity costs of trade and investment forgone.
The third factor is the role of elites and other key domestic political and soci-
etal actors. Even dictatorships usually cannot fully insulate themselves from
elites within their own governments and societies. To the extent that elite inter-
ests are threatened by compliance with the coercing state’s demands, they will
act as “circuit breakers” by blocking the external pressures on the regime. To
the extent that their interests are better served by the policy concessions being
demanded, they will become “transmission belts,” carrying forward the coer-
cive pressure on the regime to comply.21
These are factors that can change over time and interact with other internal
factors that may be strengthening or weakening the regime in their own right.
Other international factors such as global markets (e.g., oil markets) and geo-
politics can also play a role. We take these into account while keeping the ana-
lytic focus on the three sets of intratarget state factors identiªed above.
In sum, we seek to assess how soundly the coercer’s strategy combines cred-
ible force and deft diplomacy consistent with the proportionality, reciprocity,
and coercive credibility criteria, as well as key factors within the target’s do-
mestic politics and economy that affect whether the regime leadership’s self-
perpetuation is better served by cooperation or confrontation.
The Libya Case: Three Phases of U.S Coercive Diplomacy
Although the term “rogue state” did not come into common usage until the
1990s, it aptly describes Libya’s foreign policy—particularly its pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction and its involvement in terrorism—for most of the
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the permeability of the regime as indicated by the degree of independent activity of domestic ac-
tors that can act as ‘transmission belts,’ carrying the economic impact of the sanctions into the tar-
get’s core political structures.” Jonathan Kirshner offers a similar formulation stressing the
importance of identifying not only central government actors, but also “the core groups whose po-
litical support allows the regime to remain in power.” Kirshner, “Microfoundations of Economic
Sanctions,” Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 42, 45. The complementary construct of
“circuit breakers” originates with this article.
period following the 1969 coup against the pro-U.S. King Idris that brought
Qaddaª to power.22 Even though Libya had signed the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT) shortly before the coup and Qaddaª’s government ratiªed it
ªve years later, within his ªrst year in power the new Libyan leader was seek-
ing a nuclear capability. He ªrst tried to acquire nuclear weapons directly from
China but was rebuffed. Then in 1977 he approached Pakistan and in 1979 In-
dia, but with the same result. Libyan efforts then turned to developing an in-
digenous nuclear weapons program with key equipment and technology
coming from the Soviet Union, including a 10-megawatt research reactor built
in Tajura and imports of more than 2,000 tons of “yellowcake” uranium ore
concentrate for a uranium enrichment program that it pursued clandestinely
over the next twenty years.23 Libya also pursued a chemical weapons (CW) ca-
pability and, despite having joined the Biological Weapons Convention in
1982, engaged in limited research and development of a biological weapons
(BW) capability.24
A 1976 CIA report cited Libya as “one of the world’s least inhibited practitio-
ners of international terrorism.”25 The United States linked Qaddaª’s regime
to such major perpetrations as the 1972 Munich Olympics killing of Israeli ath-
letes, the 1973 assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Sudan, and the 1975 raid
of a meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in
Vienna, led by the international terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal. Libya also
was accused of providing ªnancial, technical, and logistical support to the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the
Japanese Red Army, and others. Qaddaª saw himself both as the carrier of the
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tion in Tunisia and Libya, 1830–1980 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).
23. Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 307; and “Implementation of the NPT Safe-
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Destruction,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring–Summer 1997), pp. 93–96; and Anjali
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25. “International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis,” Central Intelligence
Agency research study, April 1976, http://www.mipt.org/pdf/1976PoGT-Research-Study.pdf,
p. 20.
pan-Arab mantle of his hero, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, and as a
world revolutionary leader. “Convinced . . . of the inherent iniquity of the in-
ternational order,” Qaddaª believed that “as a vanguard revolutionary state,
Libya should help liberate the rest of the Third World and reshape its political
institutions.”26 He led the Arab rejectionist front against the 1979 Camp David
accords, and his activism also extended into North Africa. In the words of one
commentator, Libya “has at one time or other backed subversive groups in al-
most every other North African country.”27
These actions were underwritten by Libya’s growing oil revenues in the
1970s. The Libyan economy grew more than 10 percent annually from 1975 to
1979, and the 1979–80 surge in oil prices yielded a $15 billion trade surplus.
Domestically, oil revenues provided “just enough income to permit Qaddaª to
deter opposition, both by buying acquiescence through his generous distribu-
tion policies and by ªnancing repression.” Indeed, “by the late 1970s virtually
no Libyan wanted for housing, medical care or transportation, and ‘the aboli-
tion of need’ [called for in Qaddaª’s Green Book] was proceeding apace.”28
phase one: u.s. sanctions and military force, 1981–88
The ªrst diplomatic rupture between Libya and the United States occurred
soon after Qaddaª’s rise to power. By 1973 the United States had recalled its
ambassador from Tripoli, and the Nixon administration had placed restrictions
on arms sales to Libya. During Jimmy Carter’s administration, the United
States imposed partial economic sanctions on Libya after designating it a state
sponsor of terrorism. In February 1980 President Carter closed the U.S.
embassy in Tripoli.
Throughout most of the 1980s, Libya aggressively pursued a WMD capabil-
ity. It sought the materials and technology needed to establish a nuclear weap-
ons program, including gas centrifuge technology, a modular uranium
conversion facility, and two mass spectrometers to support centrifuge develop-
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ment. It engaged in small-scale uranium conversion experiments.29 Particular
progress was made on the development of chemical weapons, including the
completion of the Rabta plant in 1988, which in two years produced 100 metric
tons of blister agents and nerve gas. There also were reports that Libya used
chemical weapons against Chad in 1987.30
During the same period, Libya was involved in numerous terrorist attacks,
including the 1985 seizure of the Achille Lauro cruise ship, during which an el-
derly wheelchair-bound American was pushed overboard, as well as the Rome
and Vienna airport attacks in December 1985. On April 17, 1984, during a
small anti-Qaddaª protest by Libyan dissidents, gun shots ªred from the
Libyan diplomatic mission in London wounded ten people and killed British
police ofªcer Yvonne Fletcher, who was among the ofªcers called to monitor
the protest. Intelligence intercepts uncovered Libya’s role in the bombing of
the La Belle discotheque in Berlin on April 5, 1986, which killed three people
(including two U.S. soldiers) and injured more than two hundred others (in-
cluding more than seventy Americans).
U.S. policy toward Libya during this period involved a combination of dip-
lomatic, economic, and military coercion. In 1982 the Reagan administration
imposed an embargo on crude oil imports from Libya, and in 1985 the ban was
extended to reªned petroleum products. U.S. policy also included numerous
show-of-force skirmishes in the Gulf of Sidra, culminating in the extensive
bombings against terrorist camps, military facilities, and Qaddaª’s family
compound on April 15, 1986, in retaliation for the Berlin discotheque terrorist
attack. Qaddaª could not be directly targeted because of U.S. laws prohibiting
assassination of foreign leaders, but it would not have been happenstance had
he been killed. Although the principal declared U.S. objective was policy
change in Tripoli, the underlying one was regime change. Even before the U.S.
bombing, reports had begun to circulate of covert operations to remove
Qaddaª from power. A June 1984 CIA assessment concluded that “no course
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of action short of stimulating Qaddaª’s fall will bring any signiªcant and en-
during change in Libyan policies.”31 In one instance, William Casey, the direc-
tor of the CIA, was reported to be “increasingly aware that the President
wanted a regime change, nothing less.”32
Qaddaª reportedly was wounded in the April 1986 bombings, and for a
time thereafter appeared extremely disoriented. One of his children was said
to have been killed. But for all their damage and disruption, the bombings did
not appear to have had a signiªcant coercive impact on Qaddaª. Instead,
he retaliated with numerous terrorist attacks.33 According to the U.S. State
Department’s reports on patterns of global terrorism, in both 1987 and 1988
Libya was the third most active state sponsor of terrorism. On December 21,
1988, Pam Am ºight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 pas-
sengers and crew, including 189 Americans (many of whom were college stu-
dents returning home from study abroad for the holidays) and 11 people on
the ground. This was followed on September 19, 1989, with the bombing of the
French airline UTA ºight 772 in midair over Niger, killing 171 passengers and
crew.
The United States had used military, economic, and diplomatic instruments
against Libya, but Libya’s pursuit of WMD and support of terrorism continued
largely unabated.34 Using our analytic framework, we highlight the reasons for
the failure of U.S. coercive diplomacy in this ªrst phase of the Libya case.
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phase one: coercer strategy. The Reagan strategy toward Libya was
imbalanced. The expansiveness of the ends was highly disproportional to the
limited means. Policy change was the pronounced objective, but regime
change the underlying one, as indicated by the targeting strategy in the April
1986 bombing and various covert operations aimed at destabilizing his regime.
Yet international and domestic constraints limited the means available to
achieve the Reagan administration’s desired ends. The United States’ Euro-
pean allies provided limited support for sanctions, especially for the use of
military force. Moreover, the 1986 Iran-Contra scandal and revelations about
domestic disinformation campaigns that were part of U.S. efforts to oust
Qaddaª undermined public support for the administration’s aggressive policy
toward his country.35
Nor was there any real basis for reciprocity on either side. The Reagan ad-
ministration’s goal was to remove the Libyan dictator from power, while
Qaddaª was determined to maintain his hold on power and continue his pur-
suit of WMD and use of international terrorism as an instrument of foreign
policy. The one element the Reagan strategy did have was coercive credibility,
and as such it demonstrated the limited efªcacy of an approach that places too
much emphasis on coercion and not enough on diplomacy.
phase one: target politics and economy. Libya’s domestic political and
economic situation helped Qaddaª resist U.S. coercive pressure. The 1986 air
strikes, which were calculated to precipitate a coup, instead strengthened
“[the Libyan leader] vis-à-vis his rivals inside the government,” effectively
“ruin[ing] any remaining chances of a military revolt.”36 The bombing “even
added temporarily to Qaddaª’s domestic support by his skillful manipulation
of Libyan traditional distrust of outside interference,” an example of the type
of politically integrative effect discussed by Galtung.37
Libya’s revolutionary committees, which in the 1980s reached their peak
both domestically and in Libyan foreign policy, also were a countering factor.
Created by Qaddaª “to correct the lack of mobilization among the Libyan pop-
ulation” behind his revolutionary goals, they evolved into a powerful instru-
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ment for correcting “political deviation” and forcibly quelling political
opposition. They also projected Libya’s domestic revolution into the interna-
tional sphere. As Tim Niblock notes, the revolutionary committees “provid[ed]
support for various organizations committed to radical and often violent
change in other countries.”38 They thus short-circuited U.S. coercive efforts not
only by controlling domestic opposition, but also by institutionalizing the
same radical foreign policies that the Reagan administration was seeking to
change.
Finally, even though the Libyan economy was beginning to experience an
economic downturn, it was able to maintain its oil production at OPEC quota
levels, despite U.S. sanctions, with shifts in exports to other trade partners to
compensate for the U.S. ban; for example, Italy’s share of Libyan oil imports
increased from 19 percent in 1980 to 33 percent in 1987. Although economic
conditions reportedly caused some domestic unrest, Qaddaª largely contained
it through a mix of internal mobilization and repression.39
phase two: multilateral and sanctions based, 1989–98
Libya’s pursuit of WMD intensiªed in the 1990s. According to later Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) interviews with Libyan authorities, “In
July 1995, Libya made a strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activi-
ties.” One part of this strategy was “to exploit the chaos generated by the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union to gain access to former Soviet nuclear technology,
expertise and materials.” Another was to work with A.Q. Khan, the leader of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and master black-market WMD entre-
preneur, whose network provided Libya with 20 complete L-1 gas centrifuges
and most of the components for an additional 200 centrifuges.40 In addition, by
1990 the Rabta plant was mass producing CW agents. Although production at
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that plant was suspended later the same year, Libya’s CW program continued.
In October 1991 Libya was reportedly receiving chemical weapons materials
from employees of a German company, and in 1992, it completed a second CW
plant in Sebha.41 A few years later, reports surfaced that a large underground
facility near Tarhuna was nearly operational. When the Chemical Weapons
Convention entered into force in April 1997, Libya was not one of its signato-
ries. Other reports suggested that by the mid-1990s Libya had a biological
weapons program in the early research and development stages and that
Qaddaª was attempting to recruit South African scientists for assistance.42
Other issues did show some partial but signiªcant shifts in Libyan policy.
While the State Department kept Libya on its list of state sponsors of terrorism,
charging it with continued support of various Palestinian terrorist groups, it
also acknowledged that Libyan terrorism had decreased substantially.43 On the
Pan Am 103 case, Libya rejected U.S. and British demands that the two Lib-
yans suspected of having planted the bomb on the plane be delivered to the
United States or Scotland for trial. In March 1992, however, Qaddaª proposed
a compromise whereby they would be tried in a neutral country. Although the
United States and Britain did not immediately accept the proposal, it did prove
to be part of the basis for the agreements reached starting in 1998 that ulti-
mately settled the case.
Regionally Qaddaª pursued more cooperation and engaged in less subver-
sion, reconciling with Egypt, joining the Arab Maghreb Union, concluding in-
tegration pacts with Sudan, and signing a peace agreement with Chad. His
rhetoric toward the United States was still marked by anti-American diatribes,
but he stayed noticeably neutral during the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War. He even
opened back-channel negotiations twice in early 1992 with two former high-
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ranking U.S. government ofªcials: William Rogers, undersecretary of state for
economic affairs in Gerald Ford’s administration, and former Senator Gary
Hart.44
As with the lack of policy change in the ªrst phase, the reasons for Libya’s
policy shifts, as well as for the limited progress on WMD and the Pan Am case
in this second phase, are explained within our analytic framework.
phase two: coercer strategy. A key shift in U.S. policy under Presidents
George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton was the development of a more balanced
coercive diplomacy strategy with regard to proportionality and coercive
credibility.
Concerning proportionality, the U.S. objective shifted from regime change to
the more limited ends of policy change. Although Bush initially continued the
Reagan administration’s covert efforts to overthrow Qaddaª, by early 1991 he
had suspended the operation, acknowledging that the Libyan ruler may have
managed to turn it into a propaganda victory. When in November 1991 the
United States and Britain formally indicted two Libyan intelligence agents in
connection with the Pan Am 103 bombing, they made a set of ªve demands re-
garding Libya’s policy on the bombing and terrorism in general which, though
stiff, did not challenge the Qaddaª regime’s continued survival.45
Coercive credibility came from two main sources. The ªrst was the threat of
force against Libyan WMD development. Concerned that the Bush administra-
tion might attack the Rabta chemical weapons facility, Qaddaª claimed that a
ªre had destroyed the plant. The ªre turned out to be a hoax, but production at
the plant was suspended.46 Similarly, the threat in 1996 by Clinton’s defense
secretary, William Perry, that the Tarhuna plant would “not be allowed to be-
gin production” and that the United States would use “the whole range of
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American weapons” led Libya to halt construction.47 In both instances, the
threat of force defused potential crises, although in neither instance did it re-
sult in the cessation of Libyan CW programs or slowdown of the nuclear
weapons program.
The second source of coercive credibility was the multilateralization of sanc-
tions. In January 1992 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 731 con-
demning the Pan Am and UTA bombings and urging Libya to fully and
effectively respond to the French, British, and U.S. demands. Three months
later, when Libya failed to comply with resolution 731, the Security Council
passed resolution 748, imposing the ªrst set of multilateral sanctions against
the country.48 This marked “the ªrst time in the history of the international
struggle against modern terrorism” that a broad multilateral coalition had
“succeeded in imposing and enforcing effective sanctions against a terrorism-
sponsoring state under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council.”49
At the urging of the Clinton administration, the Security Council tightened
sanctions further in November 1993 with resolution 883.50
Three main reasons explain this shift from the limited multilateral coopera-
tion that had been a constraint on U.S. coercive diplomacy in phase one to the
greater multilateral cooperation in phase two. First, the United States and its
allies had common interests. The victims of the Pan Am and UTA bombings in-
cluded not only American but also British and French nationals. Second, the
central policy objective no longer was regime change, a position that Europe-
ans before and since have been much less willing to embrace. The third reason
was the superior strength of U.S. leadership in the early 1990s based both on
the prestige garnered from the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf
War—if there were ever a unipolar moment, this was it—and the pro-UN ori-
entation of both the Bush and Clinton administrations.
Two factors, however, still impeded U.S. strategy. First, it continued to lack
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reciprocity. Despite indications that Libya may have been open to negotia-
tions, the United States still was not ready to deal with Qaddaª. Libyan back-
channel overtures in early 1992, ªrst to Undersecretary of State Rogers and
then to former Senator Hart, appeared to show ºexibility on both the
Lockerbie and WMD issues. But both Rogers and Hart reported little receptiv-
ity in Washington for pursuing the overtures.51 Second, the families of the vic-
tims of the Pan Am 103 bombing were exerting formidable political pressure,
constraining any compromise on their case and on giving priority to any other
issues on the agenda with Libya.52 With so many of the victims having been
college students, the tragedy was especially poignant, one to which many
Americans could relate. Media coverage was widespread, up close, and per-
sonal. Numerous congressional committees held hearings. Anti-Libya resolu-
tions and bills had bipartisan sponsorship and passed with overwhelming
support. One of these, the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), provided
for sanctions on European ªrms that violated U.S. restrictions on business with
Libya, and so angered the Europeans as to diminish the multilateral support
that had been so important to the limited gains that had been made with
Libya.53
phase two: target politics and economy. Libyan internal political and
economic conditions had changed in ways that led to less short-circuiting and
greater transmission of U.S. coercive pressure. The economic problems that be-
gan in the 1980s grew worse in the early 1990s. Libya’s gross domestic product
dropped 30 percent in 1993 compared to the previous year, and growth aver-
aged less than 1 percent annually from 1992 to 1998. Unemployment reached
30 percent. Inºation was out of control, going as high as 50 percent in 1994,
Who “Won” Libya? 65
51. Slavin, “Libya’s Rehabilitation in Works since Early ‘90s.” The State Department, Hart said,
made it clear that the United States “will have no discussions with the Libyans until they turn over
the Pan Am bombers.” Hart, “My Secret Talks with Libya and Why They Went Nowhere.”
52. One measure of the inºuence of the victims’ families was that their view that economic sanc-
tions should not be lifted until settlement of the Lockerbie matter prevailed, even though major oil
companies were pushing for an easing of sanctions. Four U.S. oil companies—Occidental,
Amerada Hess, Marathon, and Hunt—had left behind $2 billion in assets, generating $2.3 billion
in annual income, which was being held in a trust. George Joffe, “Libya: Who Blinked, and Why,”
Current History, May 2004, p. 224.
53. For the Europeans, ILSA harked back to the early 1980s’ dispute over the Soviet Siberian natu-
ral gas pipeline, in which even Britain’s prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, opposed the Reagan
administration’s extraterritorial sanctions, as well as to other instances of intra-alliance contention
over extraterritoriality. Bruce W. Jentleson, Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-
West Energy Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).
and per capita income fell in real terms. The combination of falling world oil
prices, Qaddaª’s economic mismanagement, and economic sanctions took a
heavy toll on the Libyan economy.54 These were more than just economic sta-
tistics, as economic discontent began to fuel political instability.
Moreover, apparently recognizing that the abuses of the revolutionary com-
mittees were creating more opposition than they were suppressing, Qaddaª
took steps to curtail their activities.55 But this and other small moves toward
political liberalization failed to appease his political opponents. Qaddaª faced
growing political challenges from tribal groups as well as opposition groups in
exile.56 Military discontent also again became a problem, with the apparent oc-
currence of a number of coup attempts, including one in 1993 that was put
down only with the arrest of an estimated 2,000 dissidents and the execution
of six senior army ofªcers.57
Qaddaª also faced mounting Islamist opposition. In one sense, he claimed
to have created the ªrst contemporary Islamist state. In 1973, as part of his own
“cultural revolution,” he had replaced existing laws with Sharia law as de-
rived from the Koran and other Islamic sources. But he did so in ways that
threatened the traditional role of the Islamic clerics and jurists, leading to “re-
lentless repression,” as Yahia Zoubir put it, including executions of some
imams.58 Qaddaª was also in conºict with the Muslim Brotherhood and other
fundamentalist groups, forcing them into exile or underground. By the early-
to-mid 1990s, fed further by general economic discontent, the Islamic funda-
mentalist challenge to the regime intensiªed. Antigovernment attacks by
organizations such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Libya Mar-
tyrs’ Movement left an estimated 600 dead between 1995 and 1998. Benghazi
had become a major stronghold for these groups, and in May 1998 Qaddaª
sent in approximately 1,000 troops to break their hold on the city and ºesh
them out.59
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One of the groups with which Qaddaª was particularly concerned was al-
Qaida, which regarded his regime “as no better than the Saudi government, no
better than any of these other governments that they hate.”60 Indeed, in 1998
Libya issued the ªrst Interpol arrest warrant against al-Qaida leader Osama
bin Laden, accusing him of involvement in the killing of two German
antiterrorism agents in Tripoli.61
In these and other ways, changes in Libya’s domestic politics and economy
made the Qaddaª regime more susceptible to coercive diplomacy. U.S. coer-
cive pressure was increasing, while the Libyan leader’s capacity to resist was
decreasing. And the impact was beginning to threaten Qaddaª’s hold on
power.
phase three: direct negotiations, 1999–2003
On December 19, 2003, in an announcement that caught most of the world by
surprise, Qaddaª agreed to full WMD disarmament. The Libyan commitment
was to eliminate its chemical and nuclear weapons programs; declare its nu-
clear activities to the IAEA; eliminate ballistic missiles beyond a 300-kilometer
range with a payload of 500 kilograms; accept international inspections to en-
sure compliance with the NPT; eliminate all CW stocks and munitions and ac-
cede to the Chemical Weapons Convention; and allow immediate inspections
and monitoring to verify all of these actions. In rapid succession, Libya depos-
ited its instrument of accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention on
January 6, 2004, and became the 159th party to the treaty thirty days later. On
January 14 Libya ratiªed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. On March 10 it
signed the Additional Protocol to the NPT, broadening the IAEA’s inspection
authority. The inspection, dismantling, and disarmament processes have been
proceeding ever since.
In taking these steps, Libya reversed its long-standing efforts to gain a WMD
capability. In addition to Libyan actions noted earlier, in 1998 it had assembled
a modular uranium conversion facility purchased in the 1980s. In late 1999 or
early 2000, it acquired two new mass spectrometers; in September 2000 it took
possession of two advanced-design L-2 centrifuges, with 10,000 more ordered,
the ªrst parts of which began to arrive in December. Shipments of several cyl-
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inders of uranium hexaºuoride and approximately 16 kilograms of additional
uranium compounds arrived in 2001 and 2002, respectively. In late 2001–early
2002, A.Q. Khan provided Libya with the blueprint of a ªssion weapon and a
centrifuge enrichment plan “almost on a turnkey basis.”62 Between May and
December 2002, Libya conducted two successful tests of its centrifuges, albeit
without nuclear material. A ªrst shipment of Nodong ballistic missiles from
North Korea allegedly arrived along with ten North Korean scientists to work
on the program. In October 2003 the United States and several allies, working
through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), intercepted a shipment of
centrifuge equipment bound for Libya. Although later reassessed as having
overestimated Libyan capabilities, intelligence estimates at the time suggested
that Libya would have the capacity to build a nuclear warhead by 2007.63 And
as late as June 2003, the CIA stated that “evidence suggested that Libya also
sought dual-use capabilities that could be employed to develop and produce
BW agents.”64
Major progress also was made on the terrorism issue. Libya expelled the
Abu Nidal organization in 1999; broke ties with other radical Palestinian
groups; closed down training camps, and extradited suspected terrorists to
Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen.65 The 2002 State Department global terrorism re-
port credited Qaddaª for having “repeatedly denounced terrorism” since
September 11.66 Most signiªcantly, the Lockerbie case was settled through a se-
ries of steps starting in 1998 and culminating in an agreement in August 2003
to provide $2.7 billion in compensation to the victims’ families. To be sure,
some issues continued to raise concerns. In June 2004, U.S. ofªcials disclosed
evidence that the Qaddaª regime had plotted to assassinate Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah in 2003. Qaddaª greeted Ronald Reagan’s death with expres-
sions of disappointment that the former president never had been tried as a
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war criminal for the death of his daughter in the 1986 bombing.67 Human
rights violations continued. Democracy might be “the future,” as Qaddaª’s
son Seif claimed, but it surely was yet to be part of the present.68 Still, in Febru-
ary 2004 the United States reopened its interest section in Tripoli, invited Libya
to do the same in Washington, and rescinded its ban on travel by U.S. citizens
to Libya; in April 2004 it started to ease its economic sanctions against Libya;
and in June 2004 its upgraded its diplomatic mission in Tripoli to a U.S. liaison
ofªce.69 Libya had not become Canada, or even Brazil, but it no longer could
be considered a rogue state.
Earlier we noted some signs of change in Libyan policy in the early-to-mid
1990s as a result of the greater balance in U.S. strategy and changes in Libya’s
domestic politics and economy. By the late 1990s, though, the multilateral sup-
port that had been key since the early 1990s was eroding.70 Qaddaª’s more re-
strained regional behavior had put him back in favor with the Organization of
African Unity and the Arab League, both of which began to push for lifting
sanctions. In September 1997 Russia called for a Lockerbie trial compromise. In
October South African President Nelson Mandela put his unrivaled moral au-
thority behind this compromise as well. These and other developments were
reasserting international constraints on U.S. policy. So as Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright writes in her memoirs, “As our prospects for maintaining
sanctions dimmed . . . we began to consider other options.” Albright recounts
meetings with British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook over Christmas 1997, and
then “months of legal and political thrashing about” until on August 25, 1998,
Britain and the United States formally proposed that the Lockerbie bomb-
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ing suspects be tried before a Scottish court sitting in The Hague, following
Scottish law and procedures.71 Two days later they sponsored UN Security
Council resolution 1192, providing for the suspension of UN sanctions imme-
diately upon the arrival of the suspects in the Netherlands for trial, although
not permanent lifting of sanctions until the case was fully resolved. American
unilateral sanctions would remain in effect linked to the WMD issue.
Qaddaª had his own suspicions as to whether a compromise on Lockerbie
might be seen as weakness and the push would go beyond policy change back
to regime change. It took the assurances of UN Secretary General Koª Annan
and South African President Mandela that Britain and the United States agreed
that they had “no intention to interview [the suspects], or allow them to be in-
terviewed, about any issue not related to the trial,” and that they “will not be
used to undermine the Libyan regime.”72 On April 5, 1999, the two Libyan sus-
pects arrived in the Netherlands, and UN sanctions were suspended.
Another breakthrough occurred behind the scenes. A few years earlier, the
British opened secret negotiations with the Libyans focusing on the case of
Yvonne Fletcher, the London police ofªcer killed in 1984 by someone inside the
Libyan diplomatic mission, and on Libyan support for the IRA. These helped
to lay the groundwork for what in May 1999, a month after the Lockerbie sus-
pects had been handed over for trial, became U.S.-British-Libyan secret talks.
The U.S. side was led by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
Martin Indyk; the Libya side by Musa Kusa, a top intelligence ofªcial close to
Qaddaª who also had been involved in the earlier discussions with the British.
Egyptian and Saudi leaders played key roles in facilitating the discussions,
particularly Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United
States, at whose Geneva and British estates early rounds were hosted.
On Lockerbie the United States continued to demand Libyan cooperation on
the trial, payment of full compensation to the victims’ families, and formal ad-
mission of responsibility for the bombing. Assistant Secretary of State Indyk
writes that at the ªrst round of talks in May 1999, Libya “ofªcially conveyed”
an offer to end its WMD programs.73 By October it had offered to join the
Chemical Weapons Convention, including a pledge to comply with inspection
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and veriªcation provisions. While the Clinton administration made clear that
U.S. unilateral sanctions would not be lifted without a WMD agreement, U.S.
negotiators stayed focused on the Lockerbie and terrorism issues. This relative
lack of attention to the weapons issue in part reºected intelligence reports that
indicated only some WMD activity of concern and no imminent WMD
threat.74 The political constraints imposed by the Pan Am 103 victims’ families,
who insisted that Libya comply with U.S. demands regarding the Lockerbie
bombing before further steps were taken toward normalization of relations
with Libya, also contributed to the deferral of talks on WMD. Indeed the talks
were suspended in 2000 out of concern that they would be leaked during the
presidential campaign.75
During the presidential transition following George W. Bush’s 2000 victory,
Edward Walker, Indyk’s successor as assistant secretary of state for Near East-
ern affairs, briefed members of the incoming administration on the secret
Libya talks. According to Walker, administration ofªcials expressed surprise
that the talks had been taking place and showed their own concern about pres-
sure from the Lockerbie families.76 Then shortly after Bush’s inauguration, on
January 31, 2001, a verdict was reached in the Lockerbie case. One suspect was
acquitted, but the other was convicted. The administration commended the
verdict but also called on Libya to comply on payment of compensation and
acceptance of responsibility.
In mid-2001 State Department ofªcials sought to restart the secret talks.
According to Flynt Leverett, then on the Policy Planning Staff and later at the
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National Security Council, “We [the United States and Britain] presented the
Libyans with a ‘script’ indicating what they needed to do and say to satisfy
our requirements on compensating the families of the Pan Am 103 victims and
accepting responsibility for the actions of the Libyan intelligence ofªcers im-
plicated in the case.”77 U.S. negotiators reiterated the quid pro quo of perma-
nent lifting of UN sanctions. At this point WMD still was not included as a
major part of the U.S. strategy, although as under Clinton, the Bush adminis-
tration signaled that WMD “would be the central obstacle to restoring rela-
tions after the Pan Am case was resolved.”78
Following the September 11 al-Qaida attacks on the United States, Qaddaª
was one of the ªrst to condemn them. Within days Libya was already cooper-
ating with the United States on investigating the attacks “in very serious
ways,” including by providing a list of suspects.79 The next month, the secret
talks resumed with Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
William Burns representing the United States and Musa Kusa again speaking
on behalf of Libya, and the British also still heavily involved. In a speech in
January 2002, Burns described the U.S. strategy as “hard-nosed and realistic,”
though “not oblivious to the possibilities for change.” He even indirectly al-
luded to the secret talks, making reference to meetings “in recent months” that
“have been constructive, and clearly focused.”80
Within the Bush administration, however, there were disagreements about
how to proceed. Libya was noticeable for its absence from the “axis of evil” de-
scribed in President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union address. There are
various explanations as to why. One suggests that the phrase was originally in-
tended to apply only to Iraq; Iran was added at the request of National Secu-
rity Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and North Korea was “an afterthought.”81
Another stresses British inºuence: that neoconservative hawks such as Under-
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secretary of State John Bolton wanted Libya included, but British Foreign
Secretary Jack Straw and top Blair aide David Manning prevailed on Rice and
Secretary of State Colin Powell not to do so out of concern that the talks would
be undermined.82 Then, in a speech of his own delivered in May 2002 to the
Heritage Foundation, Bolton accused Libya of being one of those “rogue
states” beyond the axis of evil intent on acquiring WMD.83 When in December
the Bush administration announced its National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Libya was listed in a classiªed appendix along with Iran,
Syria, and North Korea as “among the countries that are the central focus of
the new U.S. approach,” including the option of preemptive military force
against states and terrorist groups that may possess or be seeking WMD.84
The key development in the intensiªcation of the WMD negotiations ap-
pears to have been an August 2002 trip to Libya by British Foreign Ofªce
Minister Michael O’Brien who “broached the subject with Qaddaª . . . and had
received positive assurances.”85 At a meeting at Camp David the following
month, Blair proposed and Bush reportedly accepted a reafªrmation that a
deal on WMD would bring normalization of relations. Blair then wrote a letter
to this effect to Qaddaª, who responded positively.86 In addition to the channel
through Musa Kusa, U.S. and British negotiators also were working through
Qaddaª’s son Seif, a student at the London School of Economics and Political
Science.
Apparently, though, there was further resistance within the Bush adminis-
tration. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reportedly sent a memo to
President Bush, cc’d to National Security Adviser Rice and Secretary of State
Powell, arguing that democratization and human rights, not “just” terrorism
and WMD, should be on the negotiating agenda, and that UN sanctions
should not be lifted just for a Lockerbie settlement.87 Undersecretary Bolton
pushed for a greater role in the negotiations, but pressure from “British
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ofªcials ‘at the highest level’ persuaded the White House to keep him off the
negotiating team.”88 By March 2003 talks had progressed to the point that, ac-
cording to the British, the Libyans were ready “to deal for real” on WMD.89
This also was when Libya conveyed its readiness to accept “civil liability” for
the Lockerbie bombing, the penultimate step before the $2.7 billion settlement
reached in August with the victims’ families.
In early October any pretense the Libyans still may have had of down-
playing the extent of their WMD programs was shattered by the PSI interdic-
tion in the Italian port of Taranto of the BBC China, a German-owned ship
bound for Libya carrying centrifuge technology purchased from the Khan net-
work.90 This provided deªnitive proof that Libya was developing a uranium
enrichment program and “served as a critical factor in Tripoli’s decision to
open up its weapons programs to international scrutiny.”91 Soon thereafter
U.S. and British technical teams were allowed into Libya to inspect weapons
sites, laboratories, and military factories. These initial inspections revealed
“more extensive Libyan nuclear activities than previously thought, signiªcant
quantities of chemical agent . . . [but] no evidence of an offensive biological
weapons program.”92
One of the last stumbling blocks was Qaddaª’s insistence on further reas-
surances about policy change and not regime change, that “if Libya aban-
doned its WMD program, the U.S. in turn would drop its goal of regime
change.”93 The British again were the brokers in these ªnal negotiations. The
denouement came on December 19 with the agreement for full WMD disarma-
ment. As the process of deproliferation got under way, so too did the force-
diplomacy debate over who “won” Libya.
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phase three: coercer strategy. The timing of the December 19 agree-
ment, six days after the capture of Saddam Hussein, and Libya’s March 2003
acceptance of civil liability for the Lockerbie bombing just weeks before the
start of the Iraq war, would seem to support the Bush administration’s posi-
tion that the Qaddaª regime’s decisions were products of U.S. military force.
As with many strong correlations, though, causality is more complicated. In
one sense, the Iraq war, by overextending the U.S. military and generating in-
tense international opposition, could have been interpreted by Qaddaª as re-
ducing any threat the United States could have posed to his regime. It is far
from clear that Qaddaª believed that after Hussein, he was next. Still, as one
key U.S. ofªcial stressed, the use of force in Iraq (and Afghanistan) had a
“demonstration effect” that could not be dismissed. In a broader sense, the
consequences of not settling the Lockerbie case, let alone being uncooperative
with the United States in its post–September 11 antiterrorism efforts, may have
“clariªed” Libya’s choices and “accelerated” its decisionmaking.94 British
scholar Adam Roberts makes a similar point that “it is possible [that] seeing a
fellow Arab leader unceremoniously deposed may have helped to concentrate
Qaddaª’s mind.”95 Thus, U.S. credibility on the use of force was a factor.
Force was not the only factor, though, and probably not the most important
one. A fuller analysis shows how all the elements for coercive diplomacy
success came together in phase three. First, as to coercive credibility, two non-
military factors also proved inºuential. Sanctions were one. The multilaterali-
zation of sanctions through the United Nations provided greater legitimacy
and greater economic impact, thus strengthening the United States’ coercive
position. Even after the UN sanctions were ªrst suspended and then termi-
nated, the unilateral U.S. sanctions were still having an effect on crucial parts
of the Libyan economy and would continue to do so. The other was the intelli-
gence capacity demonstrated in the Taranto interdiction. There had been other
instances when the ability of the United States and Britain to obtain reliable
and telling intelligence on Libyan activities had been crucial—for example, in
the original Lockerbie investigation shifting suspicion from Syria and Iran to
Libya, and in the British revelations of Libyan support to the IRA. As one ob-
server noted, the Taranto interdiction “appeared to have a psychological effect
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on Libyan ofªcials, who had talked in general terms about allowing in U.S.
and British experts to assess their nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
programs. Once the shipment was halted, ‘they saw how much we knew
about what they were doing.’”96
Second, in keeping to policy change and not regime change, proportionality
between ends and means was maintained. The pattern is quite striking of the
Libyans’ seeking reassurances throughout the negotiations that the terms were
policy change not regime change. They did so in the discussions leading to the
Lockerbie settlement; in the 1998–99 deal for surrender of the two Libyan sus-
pects and assurances through UN Secretary-General Annan that the trial “will
not be used to undermine the Libyan regime”; in a number of reassurances
given in the direct talks by Clinton Assistant Secretary Indyk and Bush Assis-
tant Secretary Burns; in U.S. and British assurances in March and August 2003
on the ªnal Lockerbie deal that the ofªcial acceptance of civil responsibility
would not be used as grounds for legal action against the Libyan government;
and in the WMD agreement in the ªnal reassurances needed to close the deal.
Had Libya had to guard against policy concessions opening the way to efforts
at regime change, it would have been less likely to make its dramatic policy
changes.
For these reasons, resistance of hard-line pressures to expand the agenda be-
yond terrorism and WMD in discussions with Libya was more than just intra-
administration politics. Bolton and others within the Bush administration who
favored regime change were reluctant to take yes for an answer even on major
policy changes on terrorism and WMD. Bolton reportedly was unaware of the
December 19 WMD agreement until very shortly before its public announce-
ment. And after initially being given a lead role in implementing it, he pushed
so hard to backtrack from the agreement that the British convinced the Bush
administration to restrict his involvement in the Libya matter.97
Third, the negotiating strategy of measured linkages between the carrots of-
fered and the concessions demanded established reciprocity. Although reci-
procity was temporarily in doubt when the talks were suspended during the
2000 presidential election season and when the Bush administration initially
was reluctant to reinitiate them, the pacing overall was consistent, balanced,
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and steady: UN sanctions suspended for the initial agreement to the Lockerbie
trial compromise and the surrender of the Libyan suspects; British-Libyan dip-
lomatic relations restored only after agreement on the Yvonne Fletcher case;
EU lifting of diplomatic sanctions but only some economic ones in response to
Libyan renunciation of terrorism; U.S.-Libyan conªdence-building measures
along the way—a commitment to the secret talks in themselves being one of
them; U.S. follow-through on easing its unilateral sanctions, taking steps to-
ward normalization of diplomatic relations; and other measures once the full
WMD agreement was reached and implemented. Other issues did remain re-
garding Qaddaª’s foreign and domestic policies.98 But the strategy for dealing
with them to a great extent was a continuation of the approach that had led to
progress on WMD: pressure for policy change, but not regime change, through
a mix of coercive instruments as well as incentives.
target politics and economy. The other key set of factors involved
changes in Libya’s domestic conditions that made the Qaddaª regime more
susceptible to U.S. coercive diplomacy. This may seem anomalous at ªrst
glance, because the Libyan economy was starting to recover. After oil prices
dropped sharply to $12 per barrel in 1998, they climbed to $28 per barrel in
2003; while Libya’s oil export levels remained steady, oil revenues increased
dramatically from less than $6 billion in 1998 to an average of almost $12 bil-
lion annually from 2000 through 2003.99 Unemployment remained high, but
inºation was less of a problem.100
Nevertheless, consistent with our conception of transmission belts, internal
dynamics were increasingly making cooperation, rather than confrontation,
with the U.S.-led West in Qaddaª’s own interest. Ray Takeyh recounts “an ex-
traordinary dispute [that] broke out in the higher echelons of the regime” in
the mid-1990s between “pragmatists” stressing the need for structural eco-
nomic reform and international investment and “hard-liners” wanting to con-
tinue defying the West. For a time Qaddaª “remained strangely silent, unable
Who “Won” Libya? 77
98. Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, “Nice Start, Moammar; Just a Couple of Other Things . . . ”,
Washington Post, March 28, 2004; Isabelle Werenfels, “How to Deal with the ‘New Qaddaª’? Risks
and Opportunities of Libyan-European Rapprochement,” SWP Comments (Berlin), No. 29 (October
2004), http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id51051.http://www.swp-berlin
.org.
99. Libya’s annual oil revenues in the 1990s ranged from $7 billion to almost $11 billion, except for
1998 when revenues fell below $6 billion. OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2003, http://
www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/asb2003.htm.
100. Economist Intelligence Unit, “Libya: Country Proªle, 2004,” pp. 33–34. Libya actually entered
a period of deºation beginning in 2000.
or unwilling to make a decision.” But in 1998 he sided with the pragmatists:
“‘We cannot stand in the way of progress,’ announced Qaddaª. . . . ’The fash-
ion now is the free market and investments.’”101 This development increased
the inºuence of ofªcials in the regime who had become disenchanted with
Libya’s diplomatic isolation. As Diederik Vandewalle puts it, “The pragma-
tism that the new technocrats have urged upon Qaddaª, concern over the eco-
nomic and political toll of sanctions, and the need for international investment
in the country’s deteriorating oil infrastructure and in developing new
oilªelds slowly moved Libya to act upon western demands.”102
U.S. unilateral sanctions were the technological and economic key. As one
analyst observed, “Much of [Libya’s] energy infrastructure is based upon U.S.
technology resulting from the prevalence of American ªrms during the coun-
try’s oil discovery and initial extraction. As a result, the Libyan market cannot
modernize without the assistance of big U.S. oil companies.”103 Time, it ap-
pears, was becoming of the essence. As Hammouda el-Aswad, head of Libya’s
National Oil Corporation, explained in a 1999 interview, “The Americans
knew our equipment, and they placed every item on the sanctions list. Then,
when the U.N. embargo was imposed in 1992, the problem became even more
complicated because we couldn’t buy on the open market. Some machinery
has been smuggled in, but we’ve now used up all our stores. We’ve had to go
to junkyards to recondition discarded parts, and we’ve even attempted to
manufacture our own parts, but we haven’t been successful. . . . Since [Ameri-
can companies] are way ahead of Europe in technology, especially in the en-
hancement of depleted ªelds, we need their help.”104 Libyans also knew that
the prices they could get for oil and gas concessions would be much higher if
U.S. investors and companies were part of the bidding.
Libya also came to see its security interests increasingly aligned with coun-
tries once viewed as adversaries: “He [Qaddaª] was regarded by the al-Qaeda
types as no better than the Saudi government,” Lisa Anderson states, “no
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better than any of these other governments that they hate. He found himself,
ironically, on the same side as all of these governments that he had excoriated
for a decade at least.”105 Qaddaª’s cooperation with the United States against
al-Qaida already has been noted. Although there still were instances of Libyan
bad behavior, such as the Saudi crown prince assassination plot, overall
Qaddaª’s shift was signiªcant.
Still, in the last stages of the WMD negotiations, while some bureaucratic
factions pushed for the gains to be made through a WMD deal, others more in-
vested in the program urged resistance against U.S. demands.106 But groups
whose interests were being hurt by the status quo and who would be substan-
tially helped by greater integration into the global community were stronger.
This of course is a relative statement in a dictatorship such as Qaddaª’s, as ul-
timately the crucial decisions were his. But the logic is the same: not a rogue
leader changing his basic goals so much as shifts in domestic political and eco-
nomic conditions making concessions to the coercing state in the leader’s own
interests in self-perpetuation.
Conclusions and Implications
Taken together, the three phases of the Libya case demonstrate the importance
of two key sets of factors for coercive diplomacy theory: (1) a coercer state
strategy that balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the
three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility and that
minimizes international and domestic constraints; and (2) the extent of target
state vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic condi-
tions, including the transmission belt or circuit-breaker role of elites and other
key political actors.
Phase one, the Reagan coercive diplomacy strategy, failed because it lacked
balance and because Libya’s domestic political and economic vulnerability
was limited. The punishment inºicted and costs imposed (even by the 1986
U.S. air strikes) were overridden by the politically integrative effect of focusing
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on an external enemy to strengthen internal legitimation. The Libyan economy
was experiencing a downturn, but not yet a severe one. Qaddaª largely was
able to contain domestic opposition through internal mobilization and repres-
sion. The air strikes thus did not deter and arguably precipitated further ter-
rorism, including the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing.
Phase two, the Bush-Clinton policies, had more mixed results with some
Libyan moderation but still limited progress on the Pan Am 103 case and con-
tinued pursuit of WMD. The shift from regime change to policy change pro-
vided the proportionality lacking in the Reagan strategy. The combination of
threats to use force against WMD sites and the multilateralization of sanctions
through the UN and other manifestations of international support enhanced
coercive credibility. Reciprocity, however, still was lacking, in part reºecting
the domestic political pressure from the victims’ families not to negotiate until
the Lockerbie matter had been resolved. Within Libya, economic problems had
grown worse through the combination of falling world oil prices, the misman-
agement of the Libyan economy, and the costs imposed by multilateral sanc-
tions. Political conditions also were more threatening as Qaddaª faced a major
coup in 1993 and other intraregime splits, as well as mounting Islamic funda-
mentalist opposition, including from al-Qaida.
Phase three, with the WMD agreement and the ªnal Lockerbie settlement,
was the major coercive diplomacy success. The Clinton-Bush strategy was bal-
anced in all three key respects. Although not the factor claimed by the Bush ad-
ministration, U.S. credibility on the use of force was a factor. The diplomacy
demonstrated reciprocity in the nature and timing of the concessions made
and beneªts extended. And the ends stayed focused on policy change rather
than regime change. Had the Libyans felt that they had to guard against policy
concessions being taken as signs of weakness that risked spurring further pres-
sures for regime change, they would have been less likely to make the dra-
matic policy changes that they did. The second part of the explanation
involves the growing conduciveness of Libyan domestic political and eco-
nomic conditions to coercive diplomacy. Libya was not just coerced; it also was
acting out of self-interest. Even with the multilateral sanctions having been
lifted with the Lockerbie terrorism settlement, Qaddaª still needed to get out
from under the U.S. unilateral sanctions to obtain the technology and invest-
ment necessary to revitalize the Libyan oil and gas sector. There also was the
sense that only with rapprochement with the United States would full accep-
tance back into the international community be possible. Although there still
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were those who sought to short-circuit U.S. coercive pressure, transmission
belt groups whose interests were being hurt by the status quo and would be
substantially helped by greater integration into the global community were
stronger.
In his writing on policy-relevant scholarship, Alexander George stresses two
caveats. One is that while scholars should develop policy typologies and other
cross-case comparisons, ultimately their analysis must be “actor speciªc.”
They can draw conditional generalizations about what lessons from case X ap-
ply to a similar case Y, so long as they also take into account the ways in which
the two cases are different. Second, scholarly analysis and theory can contrib-
ute more to “the conceptualization of strategies” than to detailed delineations
of policy plans. Such analysis is a valuable “starting point for constructing a
strategy,” to then be applied with actor-speciªc factors and other consider-
ations in developing the detailed elements of a particular policy.107 George
means these, and we take them, as both self-conscious limits and afªrmations
of what can be contributed both generally to the force-diplomacy policy debate
and to particular current cases such as Iran and North Korea.
In this context we draw six main policy conclusions. First, there is greater
potential complementarity between force and diplomacy than more singular
advocates of one or the other tend to convey. The credible capacity to act coer-
cively, including but not only through military force, will continue to be cru-
cial. Deft diplomacy, as the full story of the Libya case shows, is no less
important. When multilateral support was eroding, the Clinton administration
and the British made timely shifts in 1998 on a Lockerbie compromise, and
then opened the secret talks that provided a basis for beginning to build trust
and work out reciprocities. Assistant Secretary Indyk and his team showed
ºexibility but also ªrmness. When the talks were picked up again in late 2001
by Assistant Secretary Burns and his team, the approach remained one of hold-
ing ªrm on the conditions and delivering on the promises.
Second, rogue regimes are reformable.108 Libya was a case in which major
policy change was possible even by a charter rogue. The nature of the regime
clearly was a factor, but it was not determinative. Qaddaª’s main motivation
remained the same: staying in power. The means for doing so, though, proved
more functionally ºexible than ideologically ªxed. The combination of internal
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pressures and the coercive diplomacy strategy helped bring Qaddaª to a point
where his hold on power was better served by global engagement than global
radicalism.
Third, pursuing regime change can be counterproductive to achieving
policy change. There are some situations in which regime change rhetoric can
have utility. But if there still are doubts about the costs and risks that can be in-
curred in actually making regime change a policy objective, Iraq should be dis-
pelling them. Alternatively the Libya case shows what can be achieved when
regime change is taken off the table. The repeated reassurances the United
States and Britain gave Libya of policy change not regime change were abso-
lutely crucial. Rogue states need to know both that the coercer is ªrm about
not accepting too little and also trustworthy about not pushing for too much.
This runs counter to the view that keeping regime change as an option en-
hances leverage and coercive pressure.
Fourth, economic sanctions can be an effective component of a coercive di-
plomacy strategy when imposed multilaterally and sustained over time. Par-
ticipants in the undifferentiated debate over whether sanctions do or do not
work need to focus more on establishing the conditions under which they are
most likely to be effective.109 Lag time also needs to be taken into account. As
of the mid-to-late 1990s, sanctions did not appear to be leveraging much
change in Libyan policy. In the end, though, they were a key part of the coer-
cive pressure that brought about policy change.110
Fifth, multilateral support is crucial for coercive diplomacy success. The dif-
ferences in the Libya case between phase one with its very limited United
States–European cooperation, and phase two when the UN Security Council
gave its normative legitimacy and economic weight to the sanctions, and
phase three when the United States and Britain worked closely together were
key factors in the variation in coercive diplomacy success. The proliferator
needs to be convinced that it cannot drive wedges into the coercer-led coali-
tion. This means pushing the coercer’s prospective allies for a ªrm policy but
not so far as to push for too much and split the coalition.
Sixth, U.S. foreign policy makers also need to manage domestic constraints.
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When policy options that may be substantively sound but are highly charged
politically cannot be pursued or even explored, the task is all the more
difªcult. Secret talks helped in the Libya case, but secrecy in this media-
internet age is in itself a political gamble. As in other areas of foreign policy,
political leaders have to ªnd ways to take electoral and other political consid-
erations into account without sacriªcing the soundness of the policy’s strategy.
This is further complicated amid the threats and toll of terrorism, which can
have a tremendous impact on personal as well as national security.
Applying this analysis to North Korea and Iran helps both to explain the
problems and to provide parameters for potentially more effective policies.
The WMD threat in both of these cases is worse than it was in Libya’s (or Iraq’s
before the U.S. invasion). North Korea already has nuclear weapons. Although
there is some intelligence uncertainty about Iran, it is known that the programs
are more advanced than presumed before the 2002 revelations of their NPT vi-
olations and ensuing IAEA inspections.111
In both cases, the Bush administration’s policies in the ªrst term lacked the
balance seen in the Libya case. The inclusion of both North Korea and Iran in
the “axis of evil” formulation along with Iraq reinforced the specter of regime
change. Even allowing for intentional targeting of the United States as the en-
emy for propaganda purposes, there was ample precedent for the leaderships
of both countries to perceive the threat as real. This came through with North
Korea in a November 2002 back-channel overture to two prominent Americans
that included a personal message from North Korean leader Kim Jong-il to
President Bush offering to resume talks if the United States “recognizes our
sovereignty and assures non-aggression.”112 It was in even greater evidence in
the joint principles agreed to in September 2005 at the six-party talks, compris-
ing China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, in
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which the United States conªrmed that it “has no intention to attack or invade
the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]” and that “the DPRK and
the United States undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peace-
fully together and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their re-
spective bilateral policies.”113 The Bush administration ªnally was more
willing to accept policy change without regime change and, notwithstanding
the remaining uncertainties, progress was made.
The September 2005 agreement also stresses reciprocity by calling for a pro-
cess of going forward “commitment for commitment, action for action.” The
dispute within days of the conclusion of the agreement over the ªrmness and
timing of the commitment to supply North Korea with a light-water nuclear
reactor as well as other provisions raised doubts as to whether differences
were being bridged or papered over.114 Moreover, even if negotiations yield
further progress on the terms of agreement, given North Korea’s egregious
noncompliance record, implementation and enforcement will need particular
attention. Given these and other uncertainties, the Bush administration should
keep some military options open, such as strengthening security commitments
through declaratory policy, arms sales, and force deployments for allied and
friendly states potentially threatened by a nuclear North Korea. “Taking out”
North Korea’s nuclear capacity rings boldly as rhetoric but has real problems
as a military strategy given the dispersal and bunkering of many of the nuclear
facilities and obvious counterstrategies such as North Korean retaliatory at-
tacks on the demilitarized zone and Seoul.115 As with Libya, credible force can
be helpful, but deft diplomacy is the key.
On Iran, domestic political and economic factors may be so unconducive
that no coercive diplomacy strategy will sufªce. The June 2005 election
brought to power an even more conservative and anti-American regime than
before. One of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s ªrst major decisions was to
resume uranium reprocessing, breaching the agreement with the EU-3 (Britain,
France, and Germany). In his speech at the United Nations in September 2005,
Ahmadinejad launched a blistering attack on the United States and took an
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uncompromising position on the WMD issue. Iran’s major oil and natural gas
trade and investment agreements with China, India, Russia, and others have
made U.S.-EU efforts to agree on concerted multilateral action much more
difªcult, especially for UN Security Council economic sanctions. Moreover,
given the windfall revenues Iran garnered from surging world oil prices in
2005 and U.S. heightened domestic sensitivity to further oil price spikes and
supply shortages, the balance of costs from economic sanctions could tilt
against the sanctioners.
Nevertheless Iran’s potential vulnerability is not to be written off. High un-
employment and middle-class discontent persist and can produce the kind of
economic pressures that can turn into political instability.116 The Ahmadinejad
regime may ªnd, as so many other populist regimes have, that the fervor of its
appeal wanes over time without tangible improvements in the quality of life.
Thus, in the Iran case as well, U.S. strategy requires greater balance.117 This
starts with ªrm and consistent reassurance of policy change not regime
change. The United States does not have to forswear all advocacy and support
for Iranian human rights and democracy movements, but unless it commits
not to use force or covert action to seek to undermine or overthrow the Iranian
regime, progress on nuclear weapons and other key policy issues is far less
likely. Given the history of U.S.-Iran relations, this has to be a matter for direct
U.S.-Iranian bilateral talks.118 These can be held within the EU-3 umbrella; they
can be secret or public; but they must be pursued.
While the threat of military force does not have to be explicitly renounced,
its limits do need to be recognized.119 Regional commitments to allied and
friendly states potentially threatened by a nuclear Iran can be buttressed, but
invoking military threats as frequently and seemingly lightly as top Bush ad-
ministration ofªcials have done undermines coercive credibility more than re-
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inforces it.120 Iranian counterstrategies, particularly terrorism through its own
networks or by others in solidarity, need to be weighed seriously. Moreover, in
the wake of the multilateral controversies over Iraq, international support for
anything akin to a unilateral use of force by the United States against Iran is
highly unlikely.
U.S.-EU diplomacy can be ºexible in its tactics but needs to hold steady on
the objectives. Lining up multilateral support has become much harder in the
wake of Iraq and the balancing against U.S. power it has set off.121 The case
needs to be made that Iranian unwillingness to abide by its commitments to
the multilateral nonproliferation regime is not just jousting with the United
States but deªance of the will and the interests of the international community.
Making the IAEA work needs to be put above scoring rhetorical and retalia-
tory points against the Bush administration. If resolution cannot be reached
through the IAEA or in direct negotiations, the case needs to be brought to the
Security Council. Those who are the strongest proponents of multilateralism
really do have the strongest interest in the effectiveness of the regime.122
Every case is different, but there also are lessons to be learned. Iraq is teach-
ing us a lot about what not to do. Libya can teach us something about what
to do.
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